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THE "SAME CRIMINAL CONDUCT" EXCEPTION OF THE
WASHINGTON SENTENCING REFORM ACT: MAKING THE
PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIMES-State v. Collicott, 112 Wash.
2d 399, 771 P.2d 1137 (1989).
Abstract: Under the Washington Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), two or more offenses
committed in one transaction count as criminal history for the purpose of enhancing the
sentence for each offense, unless the offenses encompass the "same criminal conduct." In
State v. Collicott, the Washington Supreme Court held that offenses that share statutory
elements constitute the same criminal conduct. The court's previous approach in State v.
Dunaway focused on whether one crime furthered another. Analysis demonstrates that
Dunaway better provides for proportionate sentences, and coupled with the merger doc-
trine, adequately prevents double punishment. Thus, the Washington Legislature should
amend the SRA to codify the Dunaway approach.
In September of 1985, Eric Collicott illegally entered a counseling
center and began stealing electronic equipment. While inside the
center, he encountered a woman who had been sleeping in the build-
ing. Armed with a knife, he took the woman to another room, and
bound and gagged her. After loading the stolen property into a car, he
returned and raped her. Collicott then forced the woman to accom-
pany him as he drove to another location where he could get a gun.
Eventually the victim escaped and contacted the police.' Collicott
pleaded guilty to first degree burglary, first degree rape, and first
degree kidnapping.2
In'State v. Collicott,3 a bitterly divided Washington Supreme Court
held that these three crimes encompassed the same criminal conduct
for sentencing purposes.' The case required the court to interpret the
"same criminal conduct" exception of the Washington Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981 (SRA).5 If several offenses committed during a
single criminal episode encompass the same criminal conduct, the
1. State v. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d 399, 401-02, 771 P.2d 1137, 1137-38 (1989).
2. Id. at 400, 771 P.2d at 1137. The elements of first degree burglary are unlawful entry or
presence in a dwelling with an intent to commit a crime therein and possession of a deadly
weapon or an assault on any person in the dwelling. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.020 (1989).
The elements of first degree rape are sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion and use of a
deadly weapon, or kidnapping, or infliction of serious physical injury, or felonious entry of a
building or vehicle in which the victim is situated. Id. § 9A.44.040. The elements of first degree
kidnapping are intentional abduction with intent to use the victim for ransom, shield, or hostage;
or to facilitate a felony or flight therefrom; or to inflict physical injury; or to inflict extreme
emotional distress; or to interfere with the performance of any governmental function. Id.
§ 9A.40.020.
3. 112 Wash. 2d 399, 771 P.2d 1137 (1989).
4. Id. at 412, 771 P.2d at 1143. Justice Utter wrote for a plurality of four, with Justice
Dolliver concurring only in the result and four justices dissenting. Id.
5. Id. at 400, 771 P.2d at 1137.
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SRA mandates a significantly reduced sentence range. 6 Thus, Col-
licott's sentence was no greater than had he only committed rape.7
The court justified its decision as necessary to avoid punishing the
defendant twice.8
The problem of determining the appropriate sentence for multiple
offenses committed during a single episode long predates the SRA.
Existing constitutional and common law doctrines seek to limit the
number of offenses that can be charged from a single criminal scena-
rio. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars multi-
ple charges or punishments for the same offense.9 The common law
doctrine of merger provides comparable protection based on legislative
intent. 1o
The SRA's same criminal conduct exception represents a similar
desire, on the part of the Washington Legislature, to avoid unfair
cumulative punishment. Nevertheless, the Collicott interpretation of
same criminal conduct fails to protect against double punishment in
some cases, and in other cases expands the exception so that it under-
mines proportionate sentencing. Analysis shows that the Washington
Supreme Court's earlier approach to same criminal conduct, as articu-
lated in State v. Dunaway, " is superior to Collicott. The Dunaway
approach leads to more proportionate sentences, and together with the
merger doctrine, adequately protects against double punishment.
Therefore, the Legislature should amend the SRA to define same crim-
inal conduct consistent with Dunaway.
I. TRADITIONAL AND NEW APPROACHES TO THE
PROBLEM OF DOUBLE PUNISHMENT
A. The Traditional Protections: Double Jeopardy and Merger
The Collicott majority justified its decision on the basis that it pro-
tected the defendant from being punished twice."2 This appeal to fair-
ness is pivotal to the court's decision. Concern about double
punishment is not new. Courts have long employed two doctrines to
6. See infra note 71 (illustrating how an offender score enhances Collicott's sentences).
7. See infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text (discussing the method of calculating
sentences).
8. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 406, 771 P.2d at 1140.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9; see infra notes 13-20 and
accompanying text (discussing double jeopardy).
10. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing merger).
11. 109 Wash. 2d 207, 743 P.2d 1237 (1987).
12. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 406, 771 P.2d at 1140.
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limit cumulative punishment: the Double Jeopardy Clause and the
merger doctrine.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 13 provides
only limited protection against multiple punishment. The plain lan-
guage of the clause prohibits successive prosecutions for the same
offense. 4 Furthermore, courts cannot impose cumulative punishments
for the same offense. 5 The Double Jeopardy Clause also prevents
multiple penalties for multiple acts, or single acts that violate two or
more statutes, if the same evidence is required to prove each offense.16
In order to constitute the "same offense" offenses must be the "same"
in both law and fact. 7 Thus, all of the elements of one offense must be
included in another offense and proof of one must necessarily prove
the other.'" Otherwise, the offenses are not the same and conviction
for each offense is permissible.' Finally, the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not prohibit cumulative punishment where the legislature specifi-
cally authorizes punishment under two statutes.2 0
The common law doctrine of merger provides greater protection
than is available under double jeopardy. Although criminal defend-
ants often invoke merger and double jeopardy in the same case,2'
proof of one offense may not necessarily prove another merged
offense. 2  The purpose of merger is to prevent prosecutors from
"pyramiding" charges arising out of a single criminal transaction
where the legislature did not intend the offenses to be prosecuted sepa-
rately.23 Thus, when one statutory offense is used to elevate the degree
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
14. "[Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb ...... Ia
15. See Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1872).
16. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302 (1932).
17. State v. Vladovic, 99 Wash. 2d 413, 423, 662 P.2d 853, 858 (1983); see also Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167-68 (1977) (Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishment for both
joyriding and auto theft where all of the elements of joyriding are included in auto theft and the
same facts are used to prove both offenses).
18. Vladovic, 99 Wash. 2d at 423, 662 P.2d at 858.
19. Id.
20. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1982) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause is
not violated where the legislature intended punishment for both armed criminal action and first
degree robbery).
21. See, eg., Kladovic, 99 Wash. 2d 413, 662 P.2d 853 (1983); State v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d
926, 639 P.2d 1332 (1982) (Johnson 11); and State v. Johnson, 92 Wash. 2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249
(1979) (Johnson I).
22. For example, convictions for rape and burglary merge if proof of first degree rape requires
proof of both rape and a burglary. However, neither the rape nor the burglary alone necessarily
proves the other offense. Vladovic, 99 Wash. 2d at 420-21, 662 P.2d at 857.
23. Johnson II, 96 Wash. 2d at 936, 639 P.2d at 1337.
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of another offense the lesser offense merges into the greater offense, 24
unless the injuries caused by the two crimes are separate and dis-
tinct.25 The Washington Supreme Court has announced a merger rule
that bars separate conviction and punishment for crimes that are used
to enhance another crime.26
B. The Sentencing Reform Act and the "Same Criminal Conduct"
Exception
1. The Sentencing Reform Act
The Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA)27 attempts
to provide for sentences that balance judicial discretion and legislative
rule.28 Before the SRA, trial judges had significant discretion in sen-
tencing a defendant convicted of two or more offenses arising out of
the same transaction. The judge could order the sentences to run con-
secutively or concurrently. 29 Thus, different defendants could receive
widely disparate sentences for the same crimes. This prompted the
Legislature to direct the Sentencing Guidelines Commission to recom-
mend under what circumstances concurrent or consecutive sentences
are appropriate. 30 The Legislature, with minor changes, adopted the
Commission's recommended sentencing standards, 3I and codified
these recommendations in the SRA.32
The primary goal of the SRA is retribution.33 The first three stated
purposes of the SRA are to provide punishment that is proportionate
to the criminal offense, just, and commensurate with punishments
imposed for similar crimes.34 Sentences should also protect the public,
make frugal use of state resources, and give the offender an opportu-
nity to improve him or herself.35
24. Viadovic, 99 Wash. 2d at 419, 662 P.2d at 856.
25. Id. at 421, 662 P.2d at 857.
26, State v. Johnson, 92 Wash. 2d 671, 681, 600 P.2d 1249, 1254 (1979) (Johnson I)
(kidnapping and assault merged into first degree rape because the merged crimes were necessary
elements of first degree rape, but do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause).
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010-.910 (1989).
28. D. BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON § 2.1, at 2-2 (1985).
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.080.
30. Id. § 9.94A.040(2)(c); see also D. BOERNER, supra note 28, § 5.8(a), at 5-14.
31. WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE, FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT OF 1983, at 99-100
(1983).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010-.910 (1989).
33. D. BOERNER, supra note 28, § 2.5(a), at 2-31.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010(1)-(3).
35. Id. § 9.94A.010(4)-(6).
400
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The SRA structures but does not entirely eliminate judicial discre-
tion36 by providing a presumptive sentence range for each criminal
offense.37 Two factors determine the sentence range: the crime's seri-
ousness level38 and the length and seriousness of the defendant's crimi-
nal history (referred to as the "offender score"). 39 The SRA uses a
sentencing grid with the seriousness level as the vertical axis and the
offender score as the horizontal axis.' The intersection of the two
axes locates the presumptive sentence range.41 In addition, possession
of a "deadly weapon" separately enhances the presumptive sentence
range of certain crimes.4 2
The SRA treats multiple crimes as more serious and deserving of
punishment than single crimes.' When a defendant is convicted of
two or more offenses, the other current convictions count as criminal
history for each crime.44 The offender receives a sentence range for
each offense, which is enhanced by an offender score based on the
other offenses.45 All sentences so determined run concurrently,46
unless a person is convicted of three or more "serious violent"
offenses.47
2. The "Same Criminal Conduct Exception" and Pre-Collicott
Interpretations
The SRA further refines the constitutional and common law rules
governing multiple offenses arising out of a single criminal transaction.
If a defendant's multiple current convictions constitute the same crim-
inal conduct, then those current convictions are counted as one crime
36. Id. § 9.94A.010.
37. 111 § 9.94A.310.
38. Id. § 9.94A.320. Seriousness levels range from level I (e.g., second degree theft) to level
XIV (e.g., aggravated first degree murder), Id.
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.330 (1989). The offender scores for Collicott's crimes are as
follows: the offender score for rape and kidnapping is five for each (three for the rape br
kidnapping and two for the burglary); the offender score for burglary is four (two for the rape
and two for the kidnapping). Id.; see also STATE OF WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL, 111-18, 111-56, 111-73 (1988)
[hereinafter 1988 MANUAL].
40. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.310 (1989).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 9.94A.125. In Collicott, the defendant's knife qualified as a deadly weapon, thus
enhancing the standard range for the burglary by 18 months and the range for the rape and
kidnapping by 24 months each. Id § 9.94A.310.
43. D. BOERNER, supra note 28, § 5.8(a), at 5-16.
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.400(1)(a) (1989).
45. Id. § 9.94A.310-.320.
46. Id
47. Id. § 9.94A.400(l)(b) (in which case sentences run consecutively).
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in determining criminal history.48 In effect, this means that current
convictions do not count as criminal history.4 9 Originally, the SRA
did not define "same criminal conduct."5 Instead, the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission provided one example of offenses that fall
within the exception-second degree burglary and possession of stolen
goods obtained in the same burglary.5"
Prior to Collicott, there were a variety of interpretations of same
criminal conduct. The Washington Court of Appeals first confronted
the issue in State v. Edwards.52 Subsequent appellate courts followed
Edwards until the Washington Supreme Court modified it in State v.
Dunaway.5 3 In 1987, the Legislature amended the SRA to define same
criminal conduct.
54
From the beginning, courts focused on intent as the key to deter-
mining whether offenses encompass the same criminal conduct. In
Edwards, the court held that second degree kidnapping and second
degree assault encompassed the same criminal conduct where the
defendant abducted one victim in her automobile and waved a gun at
another victim during the kidnapping incident.5 5 The court reasoned
that offenses constitute the same criminal conduct if the defendant's
objective criminal intent did not change from one crime to the next.56
Objective criminal intent depended upon two subsidiary questions:
whether one crime furthered another and whether the crimes were
committed at the same time and place.57
In 1987, the Legislature defined same criminal conduct differently
than Edwards. 58 According to the amendment, same criminal conduct
means "two or more crimes that require the same criminal intent, are
committed at the same time and place, and involve the same victim."5 9
Unlike Edwards, objective criminal intent is not the primary focus of
the amendment. Rather, intent is one of three factors used to deter-
48. Id. § 9.94A.400(l)(a).
49. Because the sentences run concurrently, the defendant is punished only for the offense
that yields the highest offender score. 1988 MANUAL, supra note 39, at 1-7.
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.400(l)(a) (1986) (amended 1987).
51. Motion 84-368, Minutes, State of Washington Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, January 6,
1984; see also D. BOERNER, supra note 28, § 5.8(a), at 5-17 (interpreting the example as support
for a narrow construction of the exception).
52. 45 Wash. App. 378, 725 P.2d 442 (1986).
53. 109 Wash. 2d 207, 214, 743 P.2d 1237, 1240 (1987).
54. 1987 Wash. Laws, ch. 456, § 5 (effective July 26, 1987).
55. Edwards, 45 Wash. App. 378, 725 P.2d 442 (1986).
56. Id. at 382, 725 P.2d at 445.
57. Id.
58. 1987 Wash. Laws, ch. 456, § 5.
59. Id. This definition is codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.400(l)(a) (1989).
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mine same criminal conduct.6" The amendment's same time and place
requirement parallels Edwards. However, the amendment ignores the
Edwards question of whether one crime furthered another. Further-
more, the amendment mandates that multi-victim offenses are distinct
61crimes.
In State v. Dunaway,62 the Washington Supreme Court followed the
Edwards approach to objective criminal intent and the amendment's
approach to the same victim requirement. The court examined three
separate prosecutions: Dunaway's (first degree kidnapping and first
degree robbery); Green's (first degree robbery and attempted first
degree murder); and Franklin's (first degree robbery and attempted
first degree murder).63 A unanimous court held that the crimes in
each of these cases did not encompass the same criminal conduct. For
Dunaway, the kidnapping furthered the robbery, but the crimes
affected two victims.64 For both Green and Franklin, neither of the
individual defendant's two crimes furthered the other.6
The Dunaway court developed a hybrid approach to same criminal
conduct based on elements of both Edwards and the 1987 amendment.
As in Edwards, the court focused on whether one crime furthered
another. 6 Nevertheless, Dunaway explicitly overruled the portion of
the Edwards holding that crimes affecting two victims can encompass
the same criminal conduct. 67 In this respect, Dunaway is consistent
with the 1987 statutory amendment. However, the Dunaway court
declined to apply the 1987 amendment because the criminal conduct
at issue took place before the effective date of the amendment.68
C. State v. Collicott
In State v. Collicott,69 a divided court held that Collicott's first
degree rape, first degree burglary, and first degree kidnapping encom-
passed the same criminal conduct for purposes of determining his
offender score.70 The trial judge held that the three offenses encom-
60. Arguably, the single victim and same time and place requirements may indicate whether
objective criminal intent changed from one offense to another.
61. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.400(1)(a).
62. 109 Wash. 2d 207, 743 P.2d 1237 (1987).
63. Id. at 210-12, 743 P.2d at 1238-39.
64. Id
65. Id at 217, 743 P.2d at 1242.
66. Id. at 215, 743 P.2d at 1241.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 216, 743 P.2d at 1241.
69. 112 Wash. 2d 399, 771 P.2d 1137 (1989).
70. Id.; see supra text accompanying note I (describing the facts of the case).
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passed the same criminal conduct.71 The Court of Appeals reversed
for two reasons. 72 First, each offense was completed before the subse-
quent ones began.7 3 Second, the burglary affected two victims, the
counseling center and the rape-kidnapping victim. 74 The Washington
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court correctly identi-
fied the defendant's offenses as the same criminal conduct. 75
Although professing to follow Dunaway,76 the Collicott court intro-
duced new interpretations of objective criminal intent and the same
victim requirement. The court reasoned that accompanying offenses
encompass the same criminal conduct if the offenses depend on each
other to raise each crime from second to first degree.77 The Court
called this overlapping of offenses "element sharing" and concluded
that an element sharing analysis is indispensable to a proper same
criminal conduct inquiry.78 The element sharing analysis enables
courts to examine the objective or theoretical intent behind a crime
without reference to the defendant's subjective intent.79
The Collicott opinion targets prosecutors who hope to maximize
criminal penalties based on two incompatible theories. The majority
forces prosecutors to choose between two different strategies: (1) pros-
ecuting each offense at a lesser degree in order to achieve a higher
offender score for each crime (thus, advancing each crime to the right
along the horizontal axis of the sentencing grid); and (2) recognizing
the interdependence of the offenses in order to charge each offense
under a higher degree (thus, moving each crime up the grid's vertical
71. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 402-03, 771 P.2d at 1138. The defense appealed, arguing that
the trial judge miscalculated the sentences. The prosecution appealed the holding. Id.
Without an offender score, the sentence ranges for Collicott's three crimes are as follows: Rape
1, 51-68 months; Kidnapping 1, 51-68 months; and Burglary 1, 15-20 months. WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.310-.320 (1989). If offender scores are calculated for each crime, then the
sentence range for each offense increases as follows: Rape 1, 77-102 months; Kidnapping 1,
77-102 months; and Burglary 1, 36-48 months. Id. § 9.94A.360(2)-(3); see also 1988 MANUAL,
supra note 39, 111-18, 111-56, 111-73.
72. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 403, 771 P.2d at 1139. The Court of Appeals' decision is found
at 50 Wash. App. 1046 (1988) (unreported opinion).
73. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 403, 771 P.2d at 1139.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 404, 771 P.2d at 1139.
76. "Our application of the test in Dunaway shows the contours of the correct inquiry." Id.
at 405, 771 P.2d at 1140; see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text (discussing Dunaway).
As with Dunaway, the 1987 legislative amendment was not binding because Collicott's crimes
were committed in September of 1985, before the effective date of the amendment. See supra
note 54.
77. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 406, 771 P.2d at 1140.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 405, 771 P.2d at 1139.
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axis).s The prosecutor in Colicott relied on the accompanying
offenses to elevate each one to the first degree. 8 According to the
majority, a prosecutor cannot also contend that the offenses do not
encompass the same criminal conduct for purposes of sentencing.
8 2
Otherwise, "[s]uch a strategy would . . . punish the defendant
twice."8 3
By focusing on the elements of Collicott's crimes, the majority
invited a comparison between its interpretation of same criminal con-
duct and the merger doctrine.84 The majority argued that the two
were distinguishable because crimes merge only when the "same evi-
dence" is used to prove all of the merged crimes.85 The same criminal
conduct exception affords the criminal defendant broader protection
because offenses that fall within the exception may not all be sub-
sumed within one greater offense.86 The majority concluded that
because the exception makes no mention of merger, the Legislature
intended the exception to function independently of the merger
doctrine. 8
7
Even with the introduction of a new element sharing analysis, the
Collicott majority could not justify its holding without reinterpreting
the second pillar of the Dunaway approach: the same victim require-
ment. According to the definition of first degree burglary, Collicott's
crime affected two victims: the owner of the counseling center and the
rape-kidnapping victim.88  The majority acknowledged as much.89
The court reasoned, however, that because the prosecutor's burglary
charge focused on the rape and the kidnapping to raise the burglary to
80. Id at 406-07, 771 P.2d at 1140. Forcing the prosecutor to choose between penalties
significantly reduces the sentence. For example, the sentencing midpoint for second degree rape
is two years. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.310-.320 (1989). The additional penalty for first
degree rape (second degree rape aggravated by an accompanying felony) is three years. Id. The
additional penalty for second degree rape with an offender score based on the accompanying
burglary and kidnapping is two years and six months. Id. The majority seems to argue that a
defendant may be penalized two years plus the added penalty of three years*or two years and six
months. A defendant cannot, however, be penalized by two years plus five years and six months.
Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 405, 771 P.2d at 1140.
81. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 407-10, 743 P.2d at 1141-42.
82. Id. at 406, 771 P.2d at 1140.
83. Id
84. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing merger).
85. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 410-11, 771 P.2d at 1142.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The owner of the counseling center was the victim of unlawful entry and the theft which
Collicott intended to commit upon entry. The woman inside the center was also the victim of
burglary because Collicott assaulted her after illegally entering the building. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.52.020 (1989).
89. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 408-09, 771 P.2d at 1141.
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first degree, the woman was the "central victim."9 ° Furthermore, in
this case only one crime affected the two victims. Therefore, the court
concluded, the same victim requirement was satisfied.9'
Justice Durham, writing for the dissent, severely criticized the
majority's reinterpretation of the Dunaway test. The dissent argued
that in order to ascertain criminal intent, courts must look at the
offenses as they occurred and determine if they overlapped in time and
place and if they furthered one another.92 The dissent concluded that
none of Collicott's crimes furthered another and therefore the crimes
did not encompass the same criminal conduct. 93 In addition, the dis-
sent argued that the majority's focus on the central victim significantly
and negatively alters the same victim requirement.94
II. A BETTER APPROACH TO "SAME CRIMINAL
CONDUCT"
The Dunaway approach to the Sentencing Reform Act's same crimi-
nal conduct exception is superior to Collicott. The Dunaway court
used a furtherance test to determine objective criminal intent, whereas
the Collicott court employed an element sharing analysis. A compari-
son of these two tests and their application to different fact patterns
demonstrates that the two approaches are incompatible. Given this
conflict, the Dunaway approach is superior because it recognizes that
statutory elements alone reveal very little about intent. Furthermore,
the Dunaway approach facilitates proportionate sentences without
subjecting criminal defendants to double punishment. The Dunaway
approach also promotes proportionate sentences by strictly adhering
to the rule that same criminal conduct offenses affect only one victim.
Therefore, the Legislature should amend the SRA's definition of same
criminal conduct to be consistent with Dunaway.
A. The Conflict Between Dunaway and Collicott
Although the Collicott majority expressed its fidelity to the Duna-
way test,95 the court's element sharing and same victim analyses can-
not be reconciled with Dunaway. Both cases focused on objective
90. Id. at 409, 771 P.2d at 1141.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 414, 771 P.2d at 1144 (Durham, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 415-18, 743 P.2d at 1144-46.
94. Id. at 418-19, 771 P.2d at 1146.
95. See supra note 76.
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criminal intent.96 Each court, however, used a different test to deter-
mine whether objective criminal intent changed from one crime to the
next. The Dunaway court asked whether one crime furthered
another.97 The Collicott court instead asked whether the crimes
shared elements.9s The differences between these two approaches are
profound and the 1987 amendment does nothing to resolve the
disharmony.
Whether or not crimes encompass the same criminal conduct may
depend upon how the court defines objective criminal intent. Using an
element sharing analysis, the Collicott majority determined that a rape,
burglary, and kidnapping encompassed the same criminal conduct.
The dissent applied a furtherance test and reached the opposite con-
clusion.99 Conversely, the Dunaway approach will sometimes lead to
the conclusion that offenses constitute the same criminal conduct,
whereas Collicott would compel a different result. The Sentencing
Guidelines Commission's lone example of same criminal conduct illus-
trates this point." ° Applying the Dunaway test, second degree bur-
glary and possession of stolen goods encompass the same criminal
conduct because the first crime furthered the second crime. Applying
the Collicott test, the burglary does not depend on the other offense to
raise the level to second degree.101 Thus, according to Colicott, these
crimes do not encompass the same criminal conduct. Therefore, the
element sharing test not only conflicts with Dunaway, but also contra-
dicts the Sentencing Guidelines Commission's sole example of same
criminal conduct.
The disparity between Dunaway and Collicott is also evident in their
approaches to multiple victims. According to Dunaway, the same
criminal conduct exception does not apply if there is more than one
victim. ' 2 The Collicott court created a significant exception to this
rule, arguing that only central victims should be counted in applying
the same victim rule. 103
The 1987 amendment provides no guidance for choosing between
Dunaway and Colicott. Both courts argued that their respective tests
96. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 405, 771 P.2d at 1139-40; Dunaway, 109 Wash. 2d at 215, 743
P.2d at 1241.
97. Dunaway, 109 Wash. 2d at 215, 743 P.2d at 1241.
98. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 406, 771 P.2d at 1140.
99. Id. at 415-18, 771 P.2d at 1144-46.
100. See supra text accompanying note 51.
101. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.030 (1989).
102. State v. Dunaway, 109 Wash. 2d 207, 215, 743 P.2d 1237, 1241 (1987).
103. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 408-09, 771 P.2d at 1141.
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were consistent with the principles of the amendment. " These prin-
ciples, however, provide only an analytical starting point, which both
the Dunaway and Collicott courts found insufficient to determine
whether offenses encompassed the same criminal conduct."5 Crimi-
nal intent is an ambiguous term which the amendment does not define.
The Dunaway court additionally analyzed whether one crime fur-
thered another. 106 Similarly, the Collicott court additionally inquired
whether the crimes shared elements and whether the crimes affected
only one central victim. Because both cases undertook extra-statutory
analysis, the amendment will not likely resolve the conflict between
the Dunaway and Collicott approaches to same criminal conduct.
B. Furtherance: A Better Approach to Objective Criminal Intent
than Element Sharing
Not only may the Dunaway and Collicott approaches lead to oppo-
site results based on the same facts, but they are based on fundamen-
tally different theories of objective criminal intent. The Collicott
approach eschews factual analysis in favor of comparing the statutory
elements of the crimes committed. In contrast, the Dunaway
approach looks at the crimes as they occurred to determine objective
criminal intent. Analysis demonstrates that the Dunaway furtherance
approach is more theoretically compelling than Collicott.
The Collicott element sharing analysis abandons any inquiry into
intent and instead concentrates on statutory elements. The majority
argued that analysis of objective criminal intent is not a fact-specific
inquiry.' °7 Instead, courts should look to the theoretical purpose of
the offense as defined by the statute and the prosecutor's charge."10 In
essence, the statute and the prosecutor determine the defendant's
objective criminal intent.
The Dunaway approach to criminal intent correctly focuses on the
individual defendant's acts. Similar to Collicott, the Dunaway
approach ignores the subjective intent of the individual. But accord-
ing to Dunaway, courts should look beyond the statutes and instead
examine whether the defendant's intent changed from one crime to the
104. The Dunaway court explicitly endorsed the amendment's three factors. State v.
Dunaway, 109 Wash. 2d 207, 216, 743 P.2d 1237, 1241 (1987). The Collicott court, by
reiterating its support of Dunaway, implicitly endorsed the amendment's factors. Collicott, 112
Wash. 2d at 405, 771 P.2d at 1139-40.
105. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 406, 771 P.2d at 1140; Dunaway, 109 Wash. 2d at 215, 743
P.2d 1237, 1241.
106. Dunaway, 109 Wash. 2d at 215, 743 P.2d at 1241.
107. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 405, 771 P.2d at 1140.
108. Id.
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next by asking whether one offense furthered another.10 9 The practi-
cal consequences of the theoretical distinction between furtherance
and element sharing are profound.
L "Element Sharing" The Wrong Analytical Tool for the Job
In an effort to maximize the protections against cumulative punish-
ment, the Collicott majority used a misconceived and unnecessary ele-
ment sharing approach. Criminal defendants enjoy significant
protections against double punishment even without the Collicott
approach to same criminal conduct. The merger doctrine prevents
cumulative punishment for offenses that depend upon each other to
raise the level of an offense to first degree. 110 Because element sharing
and merger both focus on statutory elements, the Collicott majority
was compelled to distinguish the two. Nevertheless, element sharing
duplicates the pr6tections available under merger. By focusing on
objective criminal intent, the Dunaway approach provides additional
protection where one crime furthers another.
a. Preventing Cumulative Punishment with the Merger Doctrine
The common law doctrine of merger protects against cumulative
punishment. The Collicott majority correctly perceived that merger
would not lessen Collicott's sentences. However, merger would pro-
tect against double punishment if Collicott had not been armed and
had committed only the burglary and the rape. Under the merger
doctrine, 11 the burglary merges into the rape and is not separately
punishable because burglary is a necessary element to prove first
degree rape.1 12 This serves exactly the same purpose as the Collicott
element sharing analysis-to prevent the prosecutor from arguing
both that current offenses are related in order to enhance the degree of
each crime and that current offenses are separate in order to enhance
the offender score for each crime.1 13
109. Dunaway, 109 Wash. 2d at 215, 743 P.2d at 1241; see also Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 414,
771 P.2d at 1144 (Durham, J., dissenting).
110. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not afford Collicott any protection. Each of
Collicott's three offenses requires evidence that the others do not. See supra note 2 (describing
the elements of first degree burglary, rape, and kidnapping).
111. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing the merger doctrine).
112. See State v. Johnson, 92 Wash. 2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979) (Johnson I) (holding that
the crimes of first degree assault and first degree kidnapping merged into the crime of first degree
rape because the merged crimes were necessary elements to prove first degree rape and had no
independent purpose or effect).
113. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 406-07, 771 P.2d at 1140.
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The similarity between element sharing and merger compelled the
Collicott majority to distinguish the two concepts." 4 The majority
argued that crimes may share elements and thus encompass the same
criminal conduct, but not merge into one greater offense." 5 The
majority asserted that for crimes to merge the same evidence must be
used to prove all offenses.' 1 6 However, this standard is the test not for
merger but for double jeopardy." 7 This restrictive view of merger
cannot be reconciled with the court's decision in Johnson 1.18 There,
the court held that assault and kidnapping convictions merged into
first degree rape even though the merged offenses required proof of
elements not shared by the rape.1" 9 Thus, the Collicott majority had to
understate the scope of the merger doctrine in order to justify its new
element sharing analysis.
The Collicott element sharing approach duplicates the protections
against double punishment available under merger. Both focus on
statutory elements. Justice Durham in dissent recognized the Collicott
majority's reliance on merger principles as fundamentally different
from the Dunaway approach: "Merger principles involve comparison
of the elements of crimes, without consideration of criminal intent. It
is that intent upon which Dunaway focuses, a difference that the
majority has failed to recognize." 120 By framing its analysis of crimi-
nal intent in terms of legal elements, the Collicott majority hoped to
better protect criminal defendants from double punishment. In fact,
the court abandoned the qualitatively different protection available
under the Dunaway test.
b. Preventing Double Punishment with the Dunaway Approach
Courts should keep the same criminal conduct exception distinct
from merger because, by focusing on intent, the same criminal con-
duct exception provides another level of protection against double
punishment that is not available under merger. The ostensible pur-
pose of the Collicott majority's element sharing analysis is to expand
the protections against double punishment beyond what is possible
under the current merger doctrine. Nevertheless, the Collicott
approach, by focusing on the elements of the crime, may actually
114. Id. at 410-11, 771 P.2d at 1142-43.
115. Id. at 411, 771 P.2d at 1142.
116. Id.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20 (discussing double jeopardy).
118. State v. Johnson, 92 Wash. 2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979) (Johnson 1).
119. Id. at 680-81, 600 P.2d at 1254.
120. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 414 n.2, 771 P.2d at 1144 n.1 (Durham, J., dissenting).
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afford the criminal defendant less protection in some cases than Duna-
way coupled with the merger doctrine. This is evident by applying
both tests to the facts of a pre-SRA merger case. In State v. Johnson
(Johnson I1),121 the defendant was convicted of first degree statutory
rape and indecent liberties for two incidents that occurred at the same
time and place and involved the same five-year-old girl. 122 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court held that the two convictions did not merge
because committing indecent liberties was not an element of first
degree statutory rape.1
23
The Collicott approach would not help the defendant in Johnson I1
Applying the element sharing analysis to these facts mandates the con-
clusion that statutory rape and indecent liberties do not encompass the
same criminal conduct. The elements of first degree statutory rape do
not include indecent liberties.1 24 Therefore, since a statutory rape con-
viction does not depend on the indecent liberties conviction to obtain a
higher degree, the two offenses do not fall within the same criminal
conduct exception. 125
The Dunaway test would yield a vastly different result. The Duna-
way approach focuses on the defendant's objective criminal intent and
whether one crime furthered another. In Johnson II, the two crimes of
statutory rape and indecent liberties furthered a single criminal pur-
pose--to have sexual contact with a child.126  Thus, these crimes
encompass the same criminal conduct and therefore the defendant's
sentences may not be enhanced by an offender score.
Together the merger doctrine and the Dunaway approach provide
two levels of protection against double punishment. Under merger,
when one offense raises the degree of another offense, the lesser offense
merges into the greater offense. The Dunaway approach provides a
second level of protection. If the defendant's criminal purpose did not
change from one offense to another, then the offenses encompass the
same criminal conduct and the sentences cannot be enhanced by an
121. 96 Wash. 2d 926, 639 P.2d 1332 (1982).
122. Id. at 927, 639 P.2d at 1333. A person over thirteen years old is guilty of statutory rape
for engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is less than eleven. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.44.070 (1989). Indecent liberties occurs when a person knowingly makes sexual contact
with another person who is less than fourteen years of age. Id § 9A.44.100.
123. Johnson II, 96 Wash. 2d at 934, 639 P.2d at 1336.
124. See supra note 122 (describing the elements of both crimes).
125. Sexual contact is arguably an element of both statutory rape and indecent liberties.
However, the Collicott majority gave no indication that element sharing meant anything other
than crimes depending on each other to raise the degree of each crime. State v. Collicott, 112
Wash. 2d 399; 406, 771 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1989).
126. D. BOERNER, supra note 28, § 5.8(a), at 5-18.
Washington Law Review
offender score. The Collicott court understates the protection against
double punishment available under merger and construes the same
criminal conduct exception such that it does not provide the second
level of protection available under Dunaway.
2. The Dunaway Approach Ensures Proportionate Sentences
In addition to preventing double punishment in conjunction with
the merger doctrine, the Dunaway approach to objective criminal
intent facilitates results consistent with the goals of the SRA. One of
the primary purposes of the SRA is to "[e]nsure that the punishment
for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense
and the offender's criminal history." '127 The furtherance test better
fulfills this primary goal of the SRA than the Collicott element sharing
test.
The Collicott majority implicitly argued that the element sharing
analysis guarantees proportionate sentences. According to the major-
ity, accompanying offenses may be used to either raise the level of each
crime to the first degree or to enhance the offender score of each crime
under a lesser degree. 128 Using the same accompanying offenses to
enhance the offender score and degree of each crime, the court argued,
punishes the defendant twice.' 29 In other words, without element
sharing, criminal defendants would be subject to disproportionate
sentences.
Despite the majority's assertions, element sharing undermines pro-
portionate sentencing. The Collicott approach fails to punish the
defendant for any offense after the first two. In Collicott, even without
the deadly weapon,' 3 ° only one other current offense is needed to raise
the level for each offense from second to first degree.' For example,
the rape could be raised to the level of first degree either by the accom-
panying burglary or kidnapping. 32 Thus, given that the defendant's
sentences will be served concurrently, the majority's scheme fails to
punish the defendant for the accompanying offense that did not raise
the rape to first degree. Collicott's three offenses are more serious than
any one or any two of these crimes. Based on the majority's decision,
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010(l) (1989).
128. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 406-07, 771 P.2d at 1140.
129. Id. at 406, 771 P.2d at 1140.
130. The court acknowledged that the deadly weapon alone would raise the burglary and
rape to first degree, but argued that the prosecutor's charge primarily relied on the
accompanying offenses to raise the degree of each. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 408, 771 P.2d at
1141.
131. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.40.020, 9A.44.040, 9A.52.020 (1989).
132. Id.; see supra note 2 (describing the elements of first degree rape).
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however, he receives the same sentence range as if he had only raped
or kidnapped.
Under the Colicott approach, violent offenses may go unpunished.
Consider an offender, armed with a deadly weapon, who illegally
enters a house intending to steal any valuables. While inside, the
offender encounters the owner of the house, beats her into uncon-
sciousness, and then rapes her. The victim dies from the wounds
inflicted before the rape.
In this scenario, the defendant could be charged with first degree
burglary,133 first degree rape,134 and first degree felony-murder. 135
Once apprehended, the defendant pleads guilty to each of the three
first degree offenses. If the prosecutor's charge for each crime relies in
part on the other two offenses, then the trial court would be obliged to
follow Collicott and find that all of the offenses encompass the same
criminal conduct. In this hypothetical, the defendant's sentence range
is 240-320 months-the same sentence range earned by a defendant
who pleads guilty to first degree murder with no accompanying
offenses. 136 Because judges retain discretion within the sentencing
range, it is even possible that the second defendant may receive a sen-
tence at the high end of the range and that the first defendant may
receive a sentence at the lower end. Thus, the Collicott element shar-
ing analysis makes disproportionate sentences possible.
Such a disproportionate sentence is not possible under the Dunaway
test, which focuses on whether one crime furthered another. 137 In the
hypothetical discussed above, the crimes took place at the same time
and place and did not involve multiple victims, but none of the crimes
furthered one another. The burglary did not further the rape because
the burglary was completed as soon as the defendant illegally entered
the house with an intent to steal. 3 8 The rape did not further the mur-
der because the victim died from the earlier blows. Therefore, under
the Dunaway test, the three first degree offenses in the hypothetical did
not encompass the same criminal conduct. Thus the sentence range
for each offense must be enhanced by an offender score. As a result,
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.020 (1989); see supra note 2 (defining the elements of
burglary).
134. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.44.040; see supra note 2 (defining the elements of rape).
135. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.32.030(l)(c).
136. Id. § 9.94A.310- .320 (1989). The felony-murder determines the sentence range because
it has the highest seriousness level (XIII).
137. State v. Dunaway, 109 Wash. 2d 207, 215, 743 P.2d 1237, 1241 (1987).
138. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.52.020.
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the defendant's sentence range would be 291-388 months. 3 9 This
sentence is more proportionate than the 240-320 months mandated by
Collicott because it punishes the third crime. Consequently, the Duna-
way test more faithfully adheres to the SRA's purpose that sentences
should be proportionate to the seriousness of the crimes committed.
C. The Central Victim Exception Swallows the Same Victim Rule
In addition to facilitating disproportionate sentences with its ele-
ment sharing analysis, the Collicott majority emasculated the rule that
same criminal conduct offenses cannot affect multiple victims. The
majority argued that although Collicott's burglary victimized the
owner of the counseling center, the rape-kidnapping victim was the
central victim of the burglary."4 A crime may involve a purely nomi-
nal victim."' Nevertheless, Collicott illegally entered the counseling
center and stole electronic equipment once inside.'42 This conduct
alone satisfies the elements of first degree burglary-hardly a nominal
crime. 143 The majority's reasoning leads to the conclusion that when-
ever a crime affects two victims, courts should consider only the victim
who was most affected by the crime. Thus, the majority's central vic-
tim analysis cripples the same victim requirement. Here again the
Dunaway approach is more proportionate than Collicott.
D. Restoring the Dunaway Approach
The conflict between the Dunaway and Collicott approaches to same
criminal conduct necessitates legislative resolution. Both cases agree
that objective criminal intent is the key to same criminal conduct. The
Dunaway court used a furtherance test to determine intent, whereas
Collicott employed an element sharing test. These two tests, however,
are irreconcilable and can lead to opposite results.' The furtherance
test is theoretically more sound than an element sharing analysis, pro-
vides adequate protection against double punishment when coupled
139. Id. § 9.94A.310. This sentence range is based on the felony-murder's seriousness level
(XIII). Id. § 9.94A.320. In addition, the sentence is enhanced by an offender score of five (three
for first degree rape and two for first degree burglary). Id. § 9.94A.330.
140. State v. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d 399, 408-09, 771 P.2d 1137, 1141 (1989); see supra note
88 (explaining how the woman was victimized by the burglary).
141. Justice Durham, in dissent, acknowledged that tangential victims should not be
considered in applying the same victim requirement. Collicott, 112 Wash. 2d at 419, 771 P.2d at
1146 (Durham, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 401, 771 P.2d at 1137.
143. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.020 (1989).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 95-106.
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with the merger doctrine, and facilitates proportionate sentences. 145
Therefore, the Legislature should codify the Dunaway approach. The
furtherance test could be incorporated by defining same criminal con-
duct as "two or more crimes, each of which furthers another, that
require the same criminal intent, are committed at the same time and
place, and involve the same victim." '146 The proposed amendment
obliges courts to face squarely the Dunaway question of whether one
crime furthered another.
In order to ensure that courts give effect to the Legislature's intent,
the Legislature should clarify two issues in a legislative report. First,
the report should clearly state that intent, and not statutory elements,
is the proper focus of the same criminal conduct inquiry. Courts must
use the furtherance test to determine whether objective criminal intent
changed from one crime to the next. Second, the report should specifi-
cally state that the same victim requirement is violated whenever a
crime significantly affects more than one person. Thus, the Legislature
can overrule Collicott and restore Dunaway as the correct approach to
same criminal conduct.
III. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court, in an effort to protect criminal
defendants from double punishment, has redirected the focus of the
SRA's "same criminal conduct" exception from the objective criminal
intent of the defendant to the elements of the crimes committed.
Although the Collicott "element sharing" approach helped the defend-
ant in that case, adequate protection based on statutory elements is
currently available under the merger doctrine. More importantly, ele-
ment sharing is defective because it makes possible disproportionate
sentences. In Colicott the defendant who raped, kidnapped, and bur-
glarized received a sentence range no greater than had he only raped
or only kidnapped. Thus, once a defendant commits a felony there
may be no additional punishment for any additional crimes.
State v. Dunaway provides a superior approach to the same criminal
conduct exception. By focusing on intent, Dunaway offers a second
level of protection against double punishment, which is not available
under Collicott or the merger doctrine. Crimes may not share ele-
ments and yet further each other. Furthermore, the disproportionate
result in Collicott is not possible under the Dunaway approach, which
requires that same criminal conduct offenses further each other. Dun-
145. See supra text accompanying notes 107-39.
146. Emphasis for purposes of this Note only.
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away additionally guarantees more proportionate sentences by man-
dating that same criminal conduct offenses affect only one victim.
The Legislature should restore the Dunaway approach by amending
the definition of same criminal conduct to include the furtherance test.
The Legislature should also create legislative history explicitly endors-
ing the Dunaway interpretations of objective criminal intent and the
same victim requirement. Such legislative action would clarify an
unsettled area of Washington sentencing law and ensure that punish-
ments are proportionate to the seriousness of the crimes committed.
Joseph P. Bennett
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